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NEOPLATONISM AND PARAMĀDVAITA
MICHAL JUST
ABSTRACT: There has long been a debate on the possible similarity between some forms
of Indian and Greek idealistic monism (Advaita and Neoplatonism). After a basic historical
introduction to the debate, the text proposes that Paramādvaita, also known as Kashmiri
Shaivism, is a more suitable comparandum for Neoplatonism than any other form of Advaita,
suggested in the debate. Paramādvaita’s dynamic view of reality summarized in the terms
prakāśa-vimarśa or unmeṣa-nimeṣa, corresponds quite precisely to the viewpoint of
Neoplatonism, summarized in the similar bipolar terms such as prohodos-epistrophe. The
context of the dynamic nature of reality doctrine is also quite similar (svataḥsiddhatva,
authypostasis). My arguments are based on the texts of Plotinus and Proclus (Neoplatonism)
and the texts of Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva and Kṣemarāja (Paramādvaita). Several parallel
doctrines of both systems are further discussed: the doctrine of creative multilevel
subjectivity, the doctrine of mutual omnipresence of all in all, the doctrine of creative
multilevel speech, and some corresponding doctrines on aesthetic beauty and its important
role in the Soul’s return towards its ultimate source. Some implications of the high degree of
correspondence between both systems are considered at the end of the paper, for instance
whether some similarities of compared systems might be explained on a structural basis,
since both schools ware facing similar sceptical critique (Mādhyamika, Hellenistic
scepticism).
Keywords: Abhinavagupta, authypostasis, brahmāsvāda, comparative philosophy,
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The following text is a contribution to comparative studies of Greek and Indian forms
of monistic idealism 1 , based on the texts of Plotinus (ca 204-270 AD) and
________________________
JUST, MICHAL: Department of Philosophy and History of Sciences, Charles
University, Prague, Czech Republic. Email: suryadasa@gmail.com
1 I am deeply aware of the tentativeness of the term ‘idealism’, especially in connection with non
western philosophy. Here, I mean it to point out, approximately, that cognitivity is an essential core
for a given philosophical system and not just an epiphenomenon of something else. Further discussion
in: Lusthaus 2002, 2a.
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Proclus (412-485 AD), as well as Abhinavagupta (ca 950-1020 AD), Utpaladeva (ca
900-950 AD), and Kṣemarāja (ca 975-1125 AD). Comparative studies of the monistic
schools of Greece and India are not new. To name at least one classical study on the
topic, let us mention Advaita and Neoplatonism by the Dutch Indologist J.F. Staal,
which compares Neoplatonism with Advaitavedānta of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya. As far as I
know, however, there has been no focused attempt to compare Neoplatonism with
Paramādvaita (supreme Advaita), 2 a branch of Indian non-dualism (Advaita) that
originated in Kashmir, in the very north west corner of India. As the reader will see,
Paramādvaita is in many respects a more promising comparandum3 than any other
monistic school of India. Its essential stress on the dynamic aspect of the absolute
makes it a far more suitable, but yet unexplored, comparandum to Neoplatonic
monism, which is also a dynamic system rather than a static hierarchy. The conscious
and reasoned choice of the Paramādvaita as a suitable comparandum to
Neoplatonism is thus a primary scientific contribution of this paper.
In the introduction, I will briefly introduce Indo-Greek comparative studies with a
focus on monistic schools, and summarize the discussion of the “Oriental hypothesis”
of the origin of Neoplatonic philosophy. Although the search for such “influence”
brought few substantial consequences, it provoked a detailed study of both Greek and
Indian monistic systems and forced scholars on both sides to clearly formulate the
essence of these systems; it thereby accidentally contributed to the establishment of
comparative philosophy as such.
Next, I will present both Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita as dynamic monisms.
The focus will be on the dynamic notions of both systems, such as those of creative
outflow (prohodos) and return (epistophe), and, on the Neoplatonic side, the doctrine
of the absolute as a power (to hen = dynamis panton), as well as, on the side of the
Paramādvaita, notions of prakāśa - vimarśa or the doctrine of the essential nondifference of a power and its possessor (śaktiśaktimatorabhedatā). I shall also
consider the general context of the above-mentioned insights, which is a doctrine of
the self-established (svataḥsiddha, authypostaton) absolute, which is again present in
doctrines of both schools.
In the third section, I will detail similarities between the two systems under study,
such as the doctrines of All in All and multi-levelled subjectivity, as well as some
parallel aesthetic doctrines. I consciously declined to search for historical influences
from both directions (although they are definitely not impossible) and so my
arguments are based only on structural analogies.
Some further implications of the high degree of compatibility of both systems will
be discussed in the fourth section. Although this article does not aim to resurrect the
old discussion of the possible oriental influence on Plotinus and his philosophy, its
conclusions might nevertheless provoke a deep reconsideration of it. This would
perhaps attract not only the attention of philosophers, but of historians as well. Even
2 However, the Italian scholar Raniero Gnoli has reported some resemblance within the aesthetic
doctrines of Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita. (Gnoli 1956, 47).
3 Comparandum used in the sense of participium necessitatis, i.e. what “is to be compared” or “what
shall be compared.”
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if we strictly insist on methodological abstraction from the question of influence, the
conclusions of the article might provoke another highly interesting question: whether
the similarities in these systems might be explained on a structural basis, namely by
an inevitable interaction of a metaphysical notion of substance with a devastating
sceptical critique.
1. FROM THE ORIENTAL HYPOTHESIS TO COMPARATIVE STUDIES
The debate over the possible Eastern – namely Indian, Persian or Egyptian –
influences on the philosophy of Plotinus, the founder of the Neoplatonic School,
continued throughout the 20th century. Since this debate has been summarized
brilliantly at least twice,4 I feel no need to add to it. Instead, I will discuss some points
related to our research which I think should not go without discussion.
The early formulation of the Oriental Hypothesis of the origin of Plotinus’ philosophy
depended on the presupposition of “Pure Hellenicity”, which was to consist in
rationality, clarity, and a sense of measurement or even “objectivity” in a protopositivist sense. Plotinus was subsequently thought not to fit in this frame, for at least
two reasons:
First, his philosophy is subjective in its essence. Not only did he base all his
philosophical conclusions on his own living experience, including his personal
“merging in One”, but in a way he was also the founder of the very notion of
subjectivity in the western world. Second, in his doctrine of the absolute he
abandoned the Hellenistic ideal of beauty consisting in the harmony of proportions in
favour of the ideal of an absolute of unbounded power, the power of all (dynamis
panton). The Neoplatonic absolute is the ultimate source of all harmonic proportions
in beautiful things and the beauty is therefore not reducible to them. The
philosopher’s ascent towards the absolute is thus a way to the “beautiful beyond
beautiful”, to the source of beauty creating power.5
The history of the rise and fall of the Oriental Hypothesis is hence the history of
the rise and fall of the presupposition of pure “rational” Hellenicity. Enormous work
has been done in the history of antique philosophy since the 1950s, of which we must
at least mention E. R. Dodds.6 Additionally, the pre-history of the Neoplatonic school
itself, the middle platonic school, has been attentively researched and closely
described since that time.7
The French antique-philosophy scholar E. Brehier, who identifies the source of
the “foreign element” in Plotinus as the teaching of the Indian Upanishads,8 was an
earnest advocate of the Oriental Hypothesis. Brehier’s conclusions were opposed by
A.H. Armstrong in his article “Plotinus and India”9 where he argues that even if we
4 Wolters 1982, 293-309; Staal 1961, 235-246.
5 Enn. V.8.8.
6 Dodds 1953.
7 E.g. Merlan 1953, Dodds 1928.
8 Brehier, 1936, 116-118.
9 Armstrong 1936, 22-28.
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accept Brehier’s view on Plotinus, there is no need to go as far as India or even to
leave the Greek world to find its predecessors. So although the Indian influence on
Plotinus is not “absolutely impossible”, its postulation is methodologically doubtful.
Yet there is another phase of the Oriental hypothesis that partially leaves aside the
concept of “Pure Hellenicity” and focuses on the texts themselves: this phase is
perhaps best represented by another French scholar, J. Filliozat. His method consists
of a close reading of given Greek and Indian philosophical or medical texts to search
for mutual parallels, with a subsequent discussion of their cultural and historical
contexts.
The aforesaid focus on the texts themselves brings another shift in the discussion
and gives birth to the establishment of Indo-Greek comparative studies, wherein the
question of historical influence is usually set aside in favour of seeking structural or
doctrinal parallels of the two systems. In these attempts, however, Neoplatonism
generally maintains its role as the Greek comparandum to the Indian systems, beside
the sceptic school which is often compared to some branches of Mahāyāna
Buddhism.
The key early contributions to such comparative studies include, in my opinion,
J.F. Staal’s monograph Advaita and Neoplatonism and Indologist P. Hacker’s Cit and
Nous in Advaita and Neoplatonism.10 In subsequent part of this paper I will take up
some of their ideas, but let me first mention some points of disagreement as well.
In his work, Staal sees an essential difference between Advaita and Neoplatonism
in their notions of the absolute: whereas the absolute of Neoplatonism is a potential
infinity, the absolute of Advaita is an actual infinity.11 But in fact, these claims fail to
describe reality better than their opposite. 12 At the very least, the absolute of both
Neoplatonism and the Paramādvaita branch of Advaita is a dynamic and pulsing one:
from the pole of potential infinity to the pole of actuality and back again – as we will
see in the subsequent parts of this paper and as an attentive reader of the texts of both
traditions can see for himself. This dynamic, living, pulsing absolute is the very core
of the teaching of both traditions, and any comparison which avoids this fact on either
side of its comparandum is missing an important point of its subject.
Stall’s supporting argument for the potential infinity of the Neoplatonic absolute
is the Greeks’ traditional fear of the formless and unlimited. This may be true for
Hellenes in general, but it is quite doubtful for Plotinus, who “argues in terms
shocking for traditional Hellenic thinkers as the source of Form, Measure and Limit,
the One must itself be Formless, Unmeasured, and Infinite”. 13 We see this, for
example, in VI.7. where the beauty in beautiful things is characterised as the
splendour of the Good, while the measurable symmetry just as its “by-product”.14
Thus the core of Staal’s misunderstanding is the very claim of an “actual” or
10 Staal 1962, Hacker 1977.
11 Staal 1961, 181.
12 See e.g., The One is all things (in a transcendent mode): Enn. V.2.1.2., VI.8.18.32-41. The One as
pure act: Enn. VI.37.15-16,VI.9.6.50-5.
13 See Wallis 1972, 57.
14 Enn. VI.7.22.21-24. See also Hadot 1993, Ch.IV.
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“potential” character of anything in Neoplatonism, since its clear doctrine is that
everything is actual in itself while potential in all other things.15
Although I appreciate the clarity of P. Hacker’s argument, where he putatively
identifies the Advaitic cit (consciousness) with the Neoplatonic nous (intellect), I
disagree with one conclusion of his paper, where he over-evaluates the
Advaitavedānta notion of an empty, absolute, pure reflectivity as embodied in the
notion of cit, and on this basis compares it with the Neoplatonic nous, which, being a
complexity of forms, is neither absolutely “empty” nor “pure”. From such a
perspective, Neoplatonic teachings look like an imperfect step towards an aim that is
perfected in Advaitavedānta. And on this point, I must express disagreement:
Neoplatonism certainly knows the notion of an empty, absolutely pure subjectivity, as
does our suggested comparandum the Paramādvaita, but both avoid making it the
basis of the system for sound, well-argued reasons. 16 Briefly summarized, the
absolute of the above mentioned school is a living one; as such, it cannot be treated
only as a reflective “emptiness” for it is simultaneously a creative “fullness”.
Let me make one final note on the putative identity of the Advaitic cit cited above,
and the Neoplatonic nous. The very possibility of establishing such an identity and of
receiving meaningful outputs is opened by the non-obvious common base of both
traditions, which lies in metaphors common to both systems, and which can be
founded in their older referential strata, i.e. the Upanishads on the side of Advaita and
the Corpus Platonicum on the side of Neoplatonism.
Let me now select just one parallel, perhaps the most striking one. It is a common
metaphoric basis of the notion of Soul. In the referential strata of both traditions, we
find the metaphor of Soul as a composite of yoke of horses and chariot with driver.
The horses represents the passionate or sensible part of the Soul, yoked to a vehicle of

15 See also Section 3.1 of this article.
16 The topos of śūnyatā is considered in the Paramādvaita point of view, for example, in
commentaries to SK 12-13. Sp.S. (Transl. Singh, 1980,76): “The Supreme Lord himself, in order to
conceal real knowledge, shows fools void as reality so that they may accept it as the goal to be
achieved.”
Kallaṭa writes in his vṛtti: abhilāpasaṃyogāt sā śūnyāvasthā atītā mama iti smaryate, na ca
ātmasvabhāva eṣaḥ, yasmāt na tvevaṃ cidrūpatvaṃ mūḍhāvasthāvat smaryate, tasya
sarvakālamanubhavitṛtvenānubhavo nityoditatvāt (MBDL, line 1201-3.)
When the state of śūnya is being remembered as an experience “that happened to me” as in any
other case of continuity of experience, it cannot be the nature of ātman, since this nature is not
something that could be remembered, such is the case of empty (and therefore) unconscious experience
because at any time of experience there is an experiencer of it.
For the fullness of principle of Intellect in Plotinus, see e.g. Enn.V.3.5.40-45:οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς
οὗτος δυνάμει οὐδ' ἕτερος μὲν αὐτός, ἡ δὲ νόησις ἄλλο· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν τὸ οὐσιῶδες αὐτοῦ δυνάμει.
Εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη· ἓν δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὂν καὶ
τὸ νοητόν· ἓν ἅμα πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν
“... For that primal principle is no potentiality and cannot be an agent distinct from its act and
thus, once more, possessing its essential being as a mere potentiality. As an act - and one whose
very being is an act - it must be indistinguishably identical with its act.” Transl. Kenna 1969, 324 .
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the psycho-physical body, where the real core of the Soul is the driver, the charioteer:
the very top of intellectual part the Soul.17
I do not feel the need to further stress the striking presence of such parallel topos
in the core of the textual base of both systems. In my opinion, its very fact is eloquent
enough. Even the broader appeal of this metaphor is the same in both systems: to
show that hegemony over the sensual and passionate parts of the soul-body vehicle is
gained by sustained knowledge and training, whose mastery is symbolized in the
metaphor of the yoke in the hand of the charioteer. As far as I know, this metaphor is
rarely, if ever, used as a basis of a philosophic comparison, although it would
definitely deserve close attention.
2. THE ESSENTIAL DYNAMIC NATURE OF
NEOPLATONISM AND PARAMĀDVAITA
2.1

NEOPLATONISM AS A DYNAMIC MONISM

In Plato’s Sophist, there is a passage discussing the nature of being. It starts from the
usual platonic difference of unstable becoming belonging to bodies, and of being
belonging to the Intellect and Soul. From this preliminary step it would appear that
the sphere of being is devoid of any motion at all and, as surprised Plato shows,
therefore of life as well. But this contradicts the general platonic intuitions about the
nature of God and the absolute, namely, that this is not only a culmination of being
but also of beauty, considered as a living creative force. Thus in Sophistes, before he
admits motion and life in the sphere of being, the Stranger puts a rhetorical question:
But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves be easily persuaded that motion and life and
soul and mind are not really present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but
awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?18

Plotinus explored this thought quite extensively. The absolute, and to some extension
also all other subsequent levels emanating from it, is endowed with power, whose
first characteristic is life. The Intellect of Enneads is “boiling with life”19 and later
Neoplatonists made this life of the Intellect an outflowing phase of a trinity, the
Intellects’ self-establishing movement (Being-Life-Intellect).20
An important remark should be made about the relationship of this power to its
source. It is not just an arbitrary quality of a given substance, but an essential
characteristic, which is, according to Plato, a quality defining its holder in such a
substantial way that he would “either go away or vanish” if somehow it could be
taken away from him, as it happens e.g. with snow and fire. 21 The very same thought,
17 Corpus Platonicum: Phdr. 246A6-7, Upanishads: KathUp.III.3, Radhakrishnan 1994, 246.
18 Soph. 248e-249a. (Tr. by Fowler, 1921.)
19 Enn .V.5.12.9.
20 See ET.103. Also: In Tim. I.371.15-25.
21 Phaed.100c-104c.
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using the same simile of snow and fire, is used by Plotinus when he describes the
power of the One:
Even lifeless objects impart something of themselves, as far as they may; fire warms,
snow chills, drugs have their own outgoing efficacy; all things to the utmost of their
power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service. How then
could the most perfect, the First Good, remain in itself, as if it is grudged to give of itself,
or was impotent (adynaton), when it is the productive power of all things?22

The One of the Plotinian system, perfect and self-sufficient, is endowed with
power, overflowing from its source and creating subsequent levels.23 First so created
is the Intellect, which is fully established only when it turns back contemplatively
towards its source, the One. In the same way, the Intellect creates a last selfestablished substance, the Soul, which is again established as such only after its turns
back to its source, the Intellect. The first phase of this creative circular movement is
thus a kind of formless outflow, whereas the second phase is self-forming perfection
by backwards movement towards its own source. This attempt fails for structural
reasons, but leads to self-reflection, which is a perfection of self-establishing
movement. The first of these phases is poetically called Intellect in love, whereas the
second Contemplating Intellect. 24 This movement of creation cannot stop until it
reaches the level of matter, which is incapable creating anything further.25
Plotinus treated the aforesaid cyclical, hypostatical movement using two technical
terms: unformed procession (prohodos) and forming return (epistrophe). This became
part of the generally accepted Plotinian heritage in later Neoplatonism, which adds a
third phase of “remaining in itself” (mone) thus forming a trinity of remaining –
procession – return. This would become a universally applied triadic pattern for
establishing different levels of the increasingly complex system of late Neoplatonism.
Even if we focused on nothing but the dynamics described by procession and return,
the dynamic character of Neoplatonism would nevertheless be revealed in all its
fullness and clarity.
One can perhaps make an objection about the essential dynamic nature of the first
principle, the One. Can this principle be called dynamic when by definition it is
single? The answer should take the structure of the system into account. Evolution
does not take place outside the One but inside it. Moreover, as we shall see in the
following part, the Plotinian system is holistic, which means that the higher principle
is present within its evolute, in accord with its mode. The one in us is, in its own way,
the One, the power of all, much in the same way as the individual Soul has a potential
to be her sister, the world Soul, and both have the potential to ascend to their
undescendened source, the Intellect.

22 Enn. V.4.1.34-5. (Tr. by Armstrong, unless indexed otherwise)
23 Enn.V.2.1.7
24 Enn.VI.7,35
25 Enn.IV.8.6. V.2.2. See Wallis 1972, 65.

Comparative Philosophy 4.2 (2013)

JUST

8

This radical holism was criticised by later Neoplatonists, as was the metaphysical
optimism about the nature of the human Soul, which is in its upper part undescended
and eternally seated in the Intellect. But the pulsating creative character of the
absolute, including the two subsequent self-constituted emanating levels of Intellect
and Soul, was accepted and left untouched, at least as a basic structure that can
nevertheless undergo further divisions increasing its complexity. Thus Proclus
summarizes the creating process of all self established levels (authypostasis) :
“Whatever is complete proceeds to generate those things which it is capable of
producing, imitating in its turn the one originative principle of the universe.”26 And,
“Everything originally self-moving is capable of reversion upon itself.”27
2.2

PARAMĀDVAITA AS A DYNAMIC MONISM

By the term Paramādvaita, we refer to the non-dual teaching of Kashmiri Śaivism as
it culminated in the schools of Pratyabhijñā (recognition, specifically of one’s own
divine nature) and Spanda (vibration, specifically of consciousness) as it was
summarized in the work of Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja.
The schools of Pratyabhijñā and Spanda developed a theory of an essentially
dynamic, pulsing absolute, in contrast to the motionless “pure mind only” absolute of
Advaitavedānta and some Mahāyāna Buddhist schools. To understand this notion of a
dynamic absolute, we must first consider how pulsation is the very base of it. The
static and dynamic poles of reality are usually treated as God, the possessor of power
(śaktimān), and his power (śakti), respectively. In most philosophic systems
connected with mainstream orthodox Hinduism, the relation of these two poles is a
hierarchy with God, the static masculine pole of reality on the top. But the
Paramādvaita schools are, in fact, a philosophical output of tantric Hinduism wherein
the dynamic feminine aspect of reality is valued much more highly, and thus power
is equal to, or even higher than its subject, which is defined by it. The absolute of the
tantric systems is not the culmination of purity, but the culmination of power. 28
Freedom, as a characteristic of the absolute of such a system, is not empty apophatic
“freedom from”, as in e.g. Sāmkhya or Advaitavedānta, but active kataphatic,
“freedom to”.
The first rule to be remembered when talking about the Paramādvaita notion of
the dynamic absolute is the doctrine of the essential non-difference of power and its
holder (śaktiśaktimatorabheditatva). At this point, we again occasionally encounter
the “platonic” simile of the essential oneness of heat and fire or cold and snow. 29 In
Pratyabhijñā kārikā we read:
The very life of insentient beings is based on sentient ones. The life of sentient beings is
considered as the power of knowledge (jñāna) and the power of a creative act (kriyā). Of
26 ET 25 Dodds, 1963, 19.
27 ET 17 Dodds, 1963, 29.
28 See Sanderson 1985.
29 V.Bh. 18-19a
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them, the power of knowledge is self-established (svataḥ siddhaṃ) seated in a body with
power to act.30

This power of knowledge projects the content of mind as in a dream or within the
visions of yogins.31 In fact, this creative power is Śiva, the absolute, who – even in an
embodied being – never ceases the five characteristic activities (pañcakṛtya) of
creating, maintaining, destroying, concealing and revealing.32 As an embodied being,
he does so by creating, etc., the content of mind in the creative sequence (krama) of
conscious flow.33 But this creative activity is no illusion, the mental content it creates
is by no means unreal, as is the māyā of Advaitavedānta despite the fact that both
schools hold the doctrine that “everything is mind only”.34 Rather, the created world
is a real product of will (icchā) and creative potential (kriyā), which are both
expressions of the freedom (svatantrya) of the absolute. This is the “realistic” aspect
of Paramādvaita. It is a natural consequence of the paradoxical doctrine of the fully
uncompromised transcendence within the fully uncompromised immanence
(sarvamaya - sarvottīrṇa) of Śiva.35In fact, nothing that is not of the nature of the
light of consciousness can ever enter it. To be is to have the nature of consciousness36
and so there is no need for the separate categories of Sat and Cit as in
Advaitavedānta.
The dynamic nature of the absolute, which even occurs within a single cognitive
act of man, imprisoned as he is in the unstable stream of relative being (saṃsāra), is
described in Pratyabhijñā by the notions of prakāśa, the light of projecting
awareness, and vimarśa, the light of reflective awareness.37 The point of Pratyabhijñā
is that if, as in most other systems e.g., Advaitavedānta, the absolute is light only,
sans the pole of reflective awareness, it would then be a lifeless entity, e.g. a crystal
or a lamp.38
30 tathā hi jaḍabhūtānāṃ pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā, jñānaṃ kriyā ca bhūtānāṃ jīvatāṃ jīvanaṃ matam,
tatra jñānaṃ svataḥ siddhaṃ kriyā kāyāśritā satī. (IPK I.1.3-4.)
31 cidātmaiva hi devo’ntaḥ sthitamicchāvaśādbahiḥ | yogīva nirupādānamarthajātaṃ prakāśayet (IPK
I.5.7.)
32 IPK I.6.7.(tadevaṃ vyavahāre'pi prabhurdehādimāviśan | bhāntamevāntararthaughamicchayā
bhāsayed bahiḥ) also Sp.S.: evaṃ ca vyākhyāte sati yat pañcavidhakṛtyakāritvaṃ
śrīsvacchandādiśāstreṣu parameśvarasya ucyate Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 292.
33 The doctrine of vibrating consciousness in sequence of sense perception is another jewel of
Paramādvaita, its exposition would extend this article beyond a reasonable limit. For further readings,
see: TS. IV.Ah. 29, l.1-4,. KSTS.,TA IV. 121-189., Sanderson, 1990, 681-685.
34 SKV 29.: ..manmayameva jagat sarvaṃ. (For him everything is just a play, who knows that...)
Everything is of the nature of mind only...
35 SKV 55.: ...sarvottīrṇacinmātraviṣayo viśvamayaśakticakraviṣayaśca... The transcendent aspect
(of Śiva) is pure consciousness; whereas the immanent is the circle of energies, see SK 1.1. below.
36 IPVV: I. 220: astitvaṃ prakāśamānatvameva. For further references on parmādvaita ontology see
Torrela 1994, 15-20. Dyczkowski 1989, 51-57.
37 In depicting vimarśa as ‘reflective awareness’, I follow the translation of R.Torella, which seems to
me much more accurate than e.g. K.C.Pandeys’ ‘freedom’. Still it is to be remembered that vimarśa
although “reflective” is an active power! That is why sometimes it is called e.g. intuition (pratibhā).
38 IPK.I.5.11. svabhāvamavabhāsasya vimarśaṃ viduranyathā | prakāśo'rthoparakto'pi
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In the Spanda school, we find a declaration of the dynamic nature of its absolute
in its very first line: the basic text, the Spandakārikā, begins with the verse: “That
one, which by opening and closing of eyelids, is creating and destroying the world
and who is the lord of the circle of powers, we praise.” 39 As commentators have
explained, the opening (unmeṣa) and closing (nimeṣa) of eyelids are technical terms
of creative expansion and contraction of consciousness, which is called spanda (the
throb, vibration). The source of the universe is never without this power (na
tvaspandaḥ).40 Lets note that the general context of such creative pulsating process is
again self-creation (svataḥsiddhatva), since there is nothing outside absolute
(ekaśivatā).41
One of the original points of the Spanda teaching is that expansion and
contraction take place simultaneously: the expansion of the universal consciousness is
just another side of the contraction of a particular saṃsārical consciousness and vice
versa. 42 This vibration goes on, not only in the great cycles of creation (sṛṣṭi),
maintenance (sthiti) and withdrawal (saṃhṛti) of the universe, but also in each
cognitive act, each single thought followed by another throughout our daily
saṃsārical activity. Thus according to both of these schools, Śiva, the dynamic
absolute, is uncompromised in his freedom, even while present at the very core of our
individual Soul, where he performs his essential activities. The task of human
existence is thus to realize that our innermost nature (svasvabhāva) is identical with
the universal creative nature of the absolute and therefore, in an ultimate sense, free.43
Although this all sounds much like the Upanishadic dictum on the identity of the
human Soul (ātman) with the universal principle of existence (brahman), it fills this
old form with new content, stressing the essential dynamic nature of both, in fact
identical, principles.
3. SOME CORRESPONDING DOCTRINES OF
NEOPLATONISM AND PARAMĀDVAITA
3.1

ALL IS IN ALL

As we have seen in 2.1, the dynamism of the Neoplatonic One is carried through on
each level of its hierarchy. On every level, it is realized by the phase of out-flowing
potency, which subsequently turns towards its source thus creating itself in its fully
formed shape. The ultimate source of this potency is the Neoplatonic absolute, the

sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 8037.
39 SK I.1. yasyonmeṣanimeṣābhyāṁ jagataḥ pralayodayau | taṁ śakticakravibhavaprabhavaṁ
śaṁkaraṁ stumaḥ ||
40 SpN, Singh, (1980), 6.
41 See n. 30 and 55.
42 Sp.S. p. 9 (KSTS). Cit. in: Dyczkowski 1987, 61.
43 satyam, paramārthato na kaścid bandhaḥ kevalaṃ svasmādanuttarāt svātantryāt yadā svātmānaṃ
saṃkucitamavabhāsayati sa eva IPVV, Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 23821.
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One, but its self-creative power is “delegated” to all subsequently created levels of
Intellect and Soul.
Every ontological level is thus in its own way present on a lower plane, which is
again in its own turn present on a higher one. Generally summed up by Proclus:
everything exists as a cause (kat’ aitian) on its higher level, as a substance on its own
level, (kat’ hyparxin) and as a participated unity (kata metexin) on the subsequent
lower level.44
The mutual presence of all in all is not limited to the vertical axis of the
Neoplatonic system, but is present on each self-established level. The paradigmatic
level on which Plotinus develops his doctrine of the holistic interconnection, and even
interpenetration, of everything with everything else is the Intellect.
...each part (of Intellect) whichever one you take, is all things, but perhaps in different
ways. For it is actually one thing, but it has power to be all....45

In his contemplative manual describing the epistemic structure of the Intellect, he
writes:
Let us, then, make a mental picture of our universe: each member shall remain what it is,
distinctly apart; yet all is to form, as far as possible, a complete unity so that whatever
comes into view shall show as if it were the surface of the orb over all, bringing
immediately with it the vision, on the one plane, of the sun and of all the stars with earth
and sea and all living things as if exhibited upon a transparent globe.46

In this way he stresses, in a wonderful mental experiment, the mutual
interconnectivity and interpenetration in the intellectual realm. But even on the level
of the Soul we can find traces of this mutual interpenetration, as we can see in the
case of language or of science, where each sentence only makes sense when we take
into consideration the whole of the language or of science, i.e., in all other possible
sentences of a given system. 47 The border of mutual interpenetration is within the
Soul, as it copies the line of the presence of logos; and so only the lowest, most
irrational part of her, the alogon of an individual Soul and the fyzis (nature) of the
world Soul, are characterized by mutual exclusion, which we can observe e.g. in solid
objects. This corresponds to the general Neoplatonic doctrine of a gradual limitation
of the Absolute. Wherein logical difference belongs to and limits the Intellect, time
difference belongs to and limits the Soul, and the spatial difference belongs to and
limits the body.48
Plotinus’s holism reaches its peak in VI.4. In this essay, he examines the topic of
immanence: in what way the Intellect is present within us? Does it do so by a kind of
44 Enn. III.4. Summarized by Proclus in ET. 65.
45 Enn. VI.7.9.33-35.
46 Enn. V.8.9. Kenna 1969, 361.
47 Enn. V.8.4., V.9.8.
48 We can find a parallel doctrine of a voluntary limitation of the Absolute in Paramādvaita, where
the gradual limitation is done by six “hazes” (kāñcuka) of the Absolute, see IPK+IPKV, III.2.4-19.
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gleam it creates on a lower level of Soul with itself remaining on its own higher plane
– or is it present in all its mighty power and splendour wherever it exists, even at its
creation? In VI.4., Plotinus’s answer favours the latter. 49 The true “All”, i.e. the
Intellect, cannot be bereft of its power, even when it is present on a lower ontological
plane, i.e. the Soul.50 The same thought can be applied even to the One itself, thus
leaving the Plotinian system devoid of hierarchy in favour of strict holism. The
human Soul can thus travel to the intellectual realm, which she in fact has never left
(the doctrine of the undescended Soul) and can even, rarely, (Plotinus himself
succeeded but a few times) reach oneness with the top of the hierarchy, the One.
The mature formulation of holism in the Neoplatonic school is All is in all but
each according to the mode of its own existence.51 The stress on the first part of the
maxim is peculiar to some holistic tendencies in Plotinus’ thinking, whereas the stress
on the second, and corrective half, is peculiar to the later Neoplatonism of Proclus,
who made the system more rigid and the borders between its levels firmer and
clearer, but also impenetrable. According to Plotinus, the levels of ontological
hierarchy correspond to the philosopher’s stages of mind, whereas according to
Proclus, they rather correspond to all possible logical differences.
Let us now turn our attention to the Paramādvaita, where we also find a maxim
on the mutual interpenetrative presence of all in all (sic!). The verbatim it is:
“everything is of the nature of everything” (sarvaṃ sarvamayam). In Paramādvaitic
texts, it appears as a traditional saying of the school. I have encountered this maxim
here and there in the texts of Paramādvaitic schools, mostly in commentaries of
Kṣemarāja and Abhinavagupta. I still have no clear understanding of its origin and
prehistory, 52 but I guess that it is a part of a large cluster of Mahāyāna-Buddhist
doctrines inherited by Paramādvaitic authors, of which some were refuted, some
reworked, and some simply taken over.53
The maxim is not only nearly identical to the translation of the Greek pasa en
pasin, but its doctrinal context is also quite similar. In his commentary to SK 1,
Kṣemarāja describes Spanda, the creative pulse of Śiva, as the absolute. It is a wave
of consciousness that proceeds from the purest and ontologically highest levels to the
level of everyday saṃsāric existence and back. According to Kṣemarāja, Śiva in his
freedom, expands “in the process of gradual descent. (He) displays by way of
playfully concealing his inner nature, the succeeding aspect by suppressing preceding
ones”.54 Then he returns again by giving up concealment to reach his higher form, in
an interplay of expanding and contracting consciousness. So, in this way “he shows
49 Thus being one of the strongest criticisms of emanation metaphoristics, which is otherwise used in
some places in Enneads.
50 Πᾶν δὴ τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἀπολείπεται ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τε πεπληρωκὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὂν ἴσον
ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὗ τὸ πᾶν, ἐκεῖ αὐτό· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν αὐτό ἐστιν. Enn. VI.4.2.15.
51 ET 103, Dods, 1933, 93. For the history of the maxim, see also ibid, p. 254.
52 For some suggestions see Torella 2002, 15, fn. 12.
53 Many of these interactions are described in R.Torella’s notes to Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and vṛtti
(Torella 2002). The actual identity of the Buddhist doctrine sarvaṃ sarvamayam and the Neoplatonic
pasa en pasin is already noticed and discussed in Evilley 2002, 576-579.
54 Sp.N. 11, Transl. In Singh, 1980.
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everything as of the nature of everything else”. It should be said that the mutual
interpenetration described by the maxim in the Paramādvaita is just another face of
the doctrine that Everything is Śiva (ekaśivatā).55
In Abhinavagupta’s Paratrīśikavivaraṇa, we again find the maxim everything has
the character of everything, but here it is in a linguistic context. As with Plotinus,
language (logos) is a platform where interconnection of all is seen most clearly by us
as human beings. Influenced by tantric speculations on the nature of speech (vāc),
Abhinavagupta uses a slightly different strategy. Thus, in the example of the sentence
‘I, Mr. X.Y., am speaking’, he shows that the subject of the sentence is in a way
objectified, and is in fact thereby of a mixed nature: that of the first grammatical
person (I) and that of the third (He). And again, in the sentence ‘Listen to me, O
mountains’ the grammatical form is the second person (You), but in fact the
assumptive listener is an object, as it is of the nature of the third grammatical person
(It). This is according to tantric doctrines wherein, grammatically speaking, the first
person belongs to Śiva (God), the second to Śakti (power) and the third to nara
(human). All is in a way mixed on the level of language, which is, according to
Paramādvaitic doctrines adopted from the grammarian Bhartṛhari, the basic level of
any experience at all.
Another adopted Bhartṛharian doctrine is that of the fourfold speech: the
transcendental (parā), the intuitive (paśyantī), the mental (madhyamā) and the voiced
(vaikharī), a doctrine that can also serve as a basis of exposition of the maxim
everything has the character of everything. Though we use voiced (spoken) speech in
everyday communication, any such event of creating or understanding a sentence also
puts our inner mental speech to use. And to do this, we use intuitive speech, which is
an outflow of the supreme level of speech, the parā.
There is also a quite surprising parallel between the doctrine of multi-levelled
creative speech in Neoplatonism (logos) and Paramādvaita (vāc), but for brevity’s
sake no independent part will be dedicated to this topic in this article. Abhinavagupta
demonstrates that the Spandic pulse of consciousness, from pure content-less
consciousness (nirvikalpa saṃvid) to a workaday consciousness with a fully
developed content (savikalpa saṃvid) and back, can also be described as the pulse of
speech. Each part of this consciousness/speech chain has all the others hidden within,
in a contracted form, itself being the open expanded form of its own kind.
The very same playful game of concealing and revealing of the form in the pulse
of creative flow can be found in both Paramādvaita and Neoplatonism. The higher
level in the pulse of prohodos and epistrophe contains its lower evolutes in its hidden
(krifyos) form as cause (kat aitian); the lower level is the openly revealed (adiakrifos)
potency of the higher and vice versa.56 It is a doctrine we have already met, e.g. in
55 SK 29: tasmācchabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yaḥ śivaḥ.
56 TP, III.39.20-24: “plurality is in first members hidden and uncovered, in subsequent members
already openly uncovered, as much as something is closer to the One, that much it hides and covers its
plurality and itself is trying to take the form of oneness” (Ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ κρυφίως μέν ἐστι καὶ
ἀδιακρίτως ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, διῃρημένως δὲ ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις· ὅσῳ γάρ ἐστι τῷ ἑνὶ τὸ ὂν
συγγενέστερον, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον ἀποκρύπτει τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν μόνον ἀφορίζεται τὴν ἕνωσιν).
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Section 1.2., “everything is itself in actual modus while all other things in potential
modus”.
3.2

MULTILEVELLED SUBJECTIVITY

Plotinus made the very concept of the conscious ‘we’ a philosophical problem for the
first time in the history of the Western philosophical tradition, thereby discovering
subjectivity for the Western world. He was the first Greek philosopher to
systematically reflect the fact that our ‘we’ is a non-obvious, multilevelled entity,
which varies with time and circumstances. 57 Roughly expressed: the Soul’s actual
state is determined by what she contemplats. 58 R.T. Wallis sums it up by quoting
Plotinus: “from the dynamic standpoint ‛we’ are identical with the level to which we
give most attention”.59
Plotinus was also the first to systematically observe the fact that there may be, and
usually is, a long-term delay between emotionally charged experiences and their
subsequent fruit. He identified two kinds of memory corresponding to judgement and
the habitual reactivity of mind.60 In the same way in which the integrity of knowledge
is actively mediated by Idea, a traditional topic of Platonism, Plotinus also turns his
attention to personal integrity, which presupposes some higher kind of a conscious
whole, which for Plotinus is Intellect. Whether or not we are aware of it, Intellect
always “intelligizes”.61 Since one part of our Soul stays undescended62 in the Intellect,
there is also one part of our personality that is always intellectually active whether or
not we are aware of it. When we identify with this highest level of our personality we
are only potentially, but not actually, our normal daily “we”.63
Sometimes, even our activities are not accompanied by normal daily awareness
(antilepsis, parakolouthesis) but only by an immediate sense of the present moment
(synaisthesis), and are performed spontaneously without the delay of discursive
thinking, understanding, etc. 64 This immediate presence in action is evaluated by
Plotinus as a more “concentrated in itself” modus of being65 and characteristic of the
way of wise man (spoudaios).66
Let us turn to the Paramādvaita at this point where we are advised to contemplate
spontaneity as characteristic of the higher realms of being when it occurs in activities
See R.Chlup, 2009 ,96.
57 A classical passage is, e.g., Enn. VI.4.14.16; for further reading, see Hadot 1993, Ch. II., or Merlan
1953, 77-84.
58 Enn. IV.3.8.15
59 Wallis, 1972, 72.
60 Enn. IV.3.28.
61 Originally an Aristotelian doctrine. On this base P. Merlan (Monopsychism Mysticism and
Metaconsciousness) identifies that as a source of Plotinus’ doctrine of metaconsciousness.
62 Enn. IV.8.8.1-6.
63 Enn. IV.4.2.3.
64 Enn. I.4.10.21.
65 Enn. I.4.10.30-35.
66 Ibid.
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of our daily saṃsāric life. It is mostly in activities done spontaneously, with full
focus, not reflected by discursive reason. In Spandakārikā we read: “Spanda is stable
in the state one enters when extremely angry, intensely excited, running or wondering
what to do.”67 The commentator adds, e.g., that running “refers by implication to all
functions of the organs of action … including speech ... or when one sings or plays a
flute”. 68 There are also numerous verses from a meditative manual of the
Paramādvaita, the Vijñānabhairava, that refer to this practice, some of which are
cited by commentators in connection with the aforesaid kārikā.69
As we stated in the introduction, we do not intend to search for “influences”. But
let us say that the topic of multi-levelled subjectivity was at the centre of
philosophical attention in India for centuries before Plotinus. And it reached
conclusions very similar to Plotinus, which were developed in notions of saṃskāra
(the memory trace of experience) and vāsana (its contracted form, empowered by
direct influence on the behaviour of the mind) as tools for describing the
determinative function of the unconscious mind, or notions of ātman (the Soul, in its
highest most general form), buddhi (intellect), ahaṃkāra (the ego sense), manas
(mind), as tools for describing the cognitive structure of consciousness from sense
perception right up to the “metaconsciousness” of pure the reflectivity of ātman. All
this was done long before the rise of the Paramādvaita and became a part of a
common heritage of nearly every philosophical school of India.
Paramādvaita authors merely took some part of this heritage, although in some
instances with some doctrinal adjustments. Thus, i.a. the overused ātman is
sometimes replaced by a more dynamic and intimate “one’s own nature” (svabhāva).
The enemy-number-one of all orthodox schools, the ego, was dichotomized into the
artificial “I-ness” (kṛtrimā ahaṃtā) and pure “I-ness” (pūrṇāhaṃtā), where the
former bears some characteristics of the old ahaṃkāra which should be dissolved by
yogic practices, whereas the latter is, in fact, the subjective side of the absolute and
therefore, in its way, the subjective top of the epistemico-ontological hierarchy. And
yet, even the lower levels of subjectivity are not to be dissolved or destroyed if they
are viewed with correct understanding (sat tarka), merely as a play (līlā, krīḍā) and
an expression of the freedom (svatantra) of the absolute. In the ultimate sense
(paramārthataḥ), nothing at all is to be destroyed (heya) in the Paramādvaita, as it is
to be in classical yoga or in Advaitavedānta, and thus its authors could openly declare
that their new path is easy.70
In fact, for each level of the Paramādvaita universe, there exists a correspondent
subjective pole experiencing this level. The hierarchy of those subjects or observers
goes from the ultimate observer (parāpramātṛ) through the void observer
(śūnyapramātṛ), the observer of vital energy (prāṇapramātṛ) upward toward the
bodily versed observer of the body in the world of illusion (dehapramātṛ,
67 SK, I.22. transl. Dyczkowski , 1992, 100. ...atikruddhaḥ prahṛṣṭo vā kiṃ karomīti vā mṛśan |
dhāvan vā yatpadaṃ gacchet tatra spandaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ...
68 Spandavivṛtti, Transl. in Dyczkowski, 1992,101.
69 V.Bh. 101, 71, 118. Cited by Kṣemarāja in SpN, Singh, 1980, 103.
70 IPK, IV.16: ...iti prakaṭito mayā sughaṭa eṣa mārgo navo mahāgurubhirucyatesma śivadṛṣṭiśāstre...
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māyāpramātṛ). This hierarchy is perhaps best expressed by the groups of presiding
observers 71 at different levels of the Paramādvaita’s universe, parallel to the
classifications of 36 Paramādvaitic categories (tattva) from Śiva, the absolute, to the
everyday world of the senses and gross elements.
This doctrine of multi-levelled subjectivity, beside its doubtless contribution to
psychology, also plays the role of an important regulative, which protects the system
against the solipsist narcissism of single subject dreaming out its own world in both
systems: In the wonderful play of creation, we are normally aware of and situated in
our day-to-day consciousness. Its content is indeed projected by “us” but we are not
usually aware of this fact because that projecting ‘us’ is operating on a far higher or
deeper level than the level of our everyday consciousness.
3.3

SOME PARALLEL DOCTRINES IN AESTHETICS

Although “we” are in this way projecting “our” own content of consciousness, it is
ever new for us and never ceases to surprise us. This characteristic is, according to the
Paramādvaita, due to the spontaneous outflow of the power of creative intuition
(pratibhā), which is another name for the dynamic reflectivity of consciousness
(vimarśa). As with all other main activities of the absolute, it is ever present, even on
the level of an embodied subject.72 Its presence can be observed in the human ability
to create new things in a spontaneous outflow of mind, which finds its expression in
play, poetry and the arts. Abhinavagupta defined this intuition as the “insight
incessantly scintillating with ever new forms It is by virtue of this intuition alone that
one deserves the title of a poet.” 73
The ability of the absolute to come up with ever-new forms is responsible for
wonder; in both Paramādvaita and Neoplatonism, wonder is the mood of the Soul
ascending towards the absolute in a mystical vision. Wonder (ekplexis) in
Neoplatonism is a terminus technicus for a passionate state generated in the Soul by
the divine beauty of the Good. 74
The Soul, seeing the invisible as it were rejoices in itself, admires its appearing, and is
astonished at it. And the mystics, in the most holy religious rites, before receiving
mystical visions, are stricken with wonder, so in the realm of Intellect, the beautiful
appears in advance, before communion with the good...75
71 Śiva, Mantreśvara, Mantramaheśvara, Vidyeśa, Vijñānākala, Pralayākala, Sakala. See TA, XV.
15.341. Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 4229-35.
72 IPK, I.6.7. Also Sp.S.: ...māyāpramātṛbhūmāvapi parameśvarasya prakāśātmanaḥ idaṃ
pañcavidhakṛtyakāritvaṃ sthitameva, pūrṇa tutatsaṃbandha sāvadhānavijñānaśālisaṃcetyam...
73 ...prajñā navanavollekaśālinī pratibhā matā tadanuprāṇanājivadvarṇanānipunaḥ....Cit. in: Gnoli,
1956, L. Thus Abhinavagupta is in aesthetics a strict intuitionist, same as Plotinus for whom the inner
form (to endon eidos, Enn, I.6.3.8.) is responsible for both the creation and the reception of Beauty.
74 See e.g. Enn. I.6.7. 18 or ŠSV Transl. In Singh 1980, 52.
75 Proclus TP. 3.64.1-12 (TLG) ...πάντα σιγωμένην ἔχει καὶ ἀπόρρητον τὴν ἔφεσιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν
μετ' ἐκπλήξεως καὶ κινήσεως ἐγειρόμεθα. Τὸ γὰρ ἐκλάμπον αὐτοῦ καὶ δραστήριον ὀξέως διὰ πάσης
χωρεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστρέφει θεωμένην τὸ καλὸν ὡς τῷ ἀγαθῷ πάντων ὁμοιότατον· καὶ τὸ
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We find a description of this playful state in Enneads where the purified Soul of a
philosopher oscillates between a complete unification with its ultimate subject and a
partial departure from it. This leads to the state of wonder, which causes this
unification again.76 It is described by similar terms in the Paramādvaita literal corpus
e.g. by Śivasūtra: “The stations and stages of yoga constitute a fascinating wonder
”.77 The commentator Kṣemarāja adds “As a person is stuck with wonder ... even so
there is pleasant surprise for the great yogi who notices in mute wonder an expansion
of his entire complex of senses, as they come fully under the influence of the inner
self, which is a mass of consciousness and full of unique, pre-eminent, ever new
delight.”78
There are two contradictory doctrines on the nature of worldly beauty in
Neoplatonism, which extend as far as Plato’s work itself. One is entirely pessimistic
about the presence of the Soul in the world of bodies as it considers the body to be the
“grave of the Soul”. The other is more optimistic in this regard as it considers the Soul
to be on a divine mission in the realm of nature. Whereas the former is detectable in
the middle dialogues, such as Phaedo, the latter can be found in the later ones,
Timaeus, Phaedro or Symposium. Plotinus’ positive account of sensual beauty and the
emotional response it generates naturally takes its vitality from the latter, optimistic
tendency. In this neoplatonic tradition, there is a direct proportion of the degree of
being to the degree of beauty. “What does ‛really exist’ mean? That they exist as
beauties!”79 Beauty in the sensual world is in fact the beauty of form:
From what source, then, did the beauty of Helen, whom men fought for, shine out, or that
of all the women like Aphrodite herself? ... Beauty is not to be attributed to the size of the
mass ... but it comes through the eyes as form alone.80

Or rather, beauty is not of form but of its source, i.e. of the Intellect, and ultimately of
the Good. The hierarchy of beauty thus is only another side of the Neoplatonic
ontology: “…first we must posit Beauty which is also Good, and from this
immediately comes Intellect, which is beauty, and Soul is given beauty by Intellect...
Soul makes beautiful the bodies which are spoken of as beautiful.” 81 Thus we, as
embodied Souls, have a unique opportunity to take beauty as a clue, which can return

ἀπόρρητον οἷον ἐκφανὲν ἰδοῦσα χαίρει καὶ ἄγαται τὸ φανὲν καὶ ἐπτόηται περὶ αὐτό. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς
ἁγιωτάταις τελεταῖς πρὸ τῶν μυστικῶν θεαμάτων ἔκπληξις τῶν μυουμένων, οὕτω δὴ κἀν τοῖς νοητοῖς
πρὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίας τὸ κάλλος προφαινόμενον ἐκπλήττει τοὺς ὁρῶντας. Transl. by R. Gnoli
in: Gnoli 1956, XLVII.
76 Enn. V.8.11.1-11.
77 vismayo yogabhūmikāḥ ŚS. I.12., Singh 1980, 51-52.
78 Singh 1980, 52.
79 Enn. I.6.5.21 Again, some lines later: ...so for God, the qualities of Goodness and Beauty are the
same…
80 Enn. V.8.2.9-27.
81 Enn. I.6.6.25-27.
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us to the spiritual world of Intellect or even beyond it. 82 This transition is in fact
“easy” since the Good is the ultimate source of all human desire.83
The origin of the emotion of love is, according to Plotinus, a “longing for beauty
itself, which was there before in men’s Souls”. 84 The very definition of love,
therefore, is an activity of the Soul reaching after the good.85 In his system, beauty is
the concrete way by which the transcendence in immanence is realized, since “If he
(the god) is absent from the universe, he will be absent from you”. 86 Beauty, then,
serves as a bridge by which the gap between the body, the Soul and the Intellect can
be traversed.
Referring to Plato’s Symposium,87 Plotinus differentiates between two Aphrodites,
the Heavenly Mother of Eros (Ourania) and the common mother of Eros (Pandemos),
with two corresponding kinds of love. The difference dwells in the lover’s
recognition of the ultimate source of beauty in the beloved object. But Plotinus does
not brush aside the Eros of the common Aphrodite, wherein the lover fails to
recognize the ultimate source of beauty and love in its true nature. He does note that a
purer nature of bodily love is enjoyed in a “platonic” way, rather than in the way of
fully developed sexual intercourse.88 But wise men, recollecting the source of beauty,
focusing there, and thus practising a higher form of heavenly Aphrodite’s erotics, do
not condemn the lower form, since they know the playful creativity of the higher form:
“but others, those who have recollected the archetype, venerate that higher beauty
and also do not treat this earthly beauty with disrespect since they see in it the
creation and play-thing of that other”.89 It is to be remembered that the bewitching
power of beauty, which can make the Soul ascend to its ultimate source, is
apprehended in a delight and intense concentration on the vision 90 reached by the
enchanting power of love.
The aforementioned topic of divine play is also interesting since the doctrine of
the Playfulness of the Absolute is central to some Indian traditions; this includes the
famous Vaiṣnava cult of young Kṛṣṇa but it also appears in Advaitavedānta,91 and
especially in the Paramādvaita. In the passage cited above, Plotinus expresses
something quite similar in describing vertical relations inside the systemic hierarchy:
the creative energy of the higher levels can be described as play in relation to the
lower. This idea remained unexplored and undeveloped in Neoplatonism, though an
82 In the system of Plotinus “we” can even penetrate, with the help of love, the level of Intellect and
reach its apex, the Good itself: Καὶ ἕως τί ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ παρόντος, αἴρεται φύσει ἄνω αἰρομένη
ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος τὸν ἔρωτα. Plot. Enn. VI.7.22.19-21.
83 Enn. I.6.7.2.
84 Enn. III.5.1.17.
85 Enn. III.5.4.24.
86 Enn. II.9.16.25.
87Symp. 180d.
88 Enn. III.5.1. 17-18.
89 Enn. III.5.1.63-5.
90 Enn. III.5.3.9-10.
91 In the Advaita tradition the divine play as a reason of creation, as an answer on the question “why
(of creation)” is present already in Brahmasūtra (Br.S. II.1.33)
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option it remained. We can imagine this concept resolving many difficulties with the
freedom of the first principle.92
In the context of Paramādvaita, the doctrine of the divine play (līlā, krīḍā) means
that the dynamic absolute creates, sustains, and withdraws the world freely and from
its own will, playfully hiding and enfolding itself in it.93 This play is real,94 and as
such it manifests the unlimited freedom of its source. 95 Since the border line of
micro/macro cosm is a bit fuzzy in this radical Kashmiri holism, it is no wonder that
we also find the doctrine of play on the level of everyday orthopraxis. Here, divine
play is a mode of being of an enlightened yogi, who playfully abides in the world of
saṃsāra, performing all his activities in a playful way and by such means remains
untouched by the misery of saṃsāra – even in the middle of its wild stream. 96
Spontaneity is another side of such playfulness, as discussed above.
Yet there is another connected topos belonging to the semantic field of ‘play’,
which we find on the both sides of our comparandum. It is the world as theatre with
the Soul as an actor. This simile occurs both in Neoplatonism, e.g. “...but in a truer
poetic creation, which men who have a poetic nature imitate in part, the Soul acts,
receiving the part which it acts from the poet creator”,97 and quite frequently in the
Paramādvaita, wherein e.g. “the Self is an actor, the stage is the inner Soul, the
senses are spectators”, to cite the most respected locus communis on this topic.98
Abhinavagupta and others further elaborate this simile using Indian aesthetics,
namely the school of rasavāda, which considers “emotional juice” (rasa) to be the
ultimate goal of artistic performance.99 All other dramatic or poetical means such as
plot, figure, dance, music etc., merely serve the transmission of rasa. This requires
genuine active intuition (pratibhā) on the side of artist-creator and the same portion
of passive intuition on the side of spectator.100

92 E.g., Enn VI.8., which is one of the famous treaties on freedom of the first principle. Its conclusioun
is: (The One) actually is what it wants to be...”(Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐβούλετο, οὕτω καὶ ἔστιν) Enn.
VI.8.13.9.
93 Creation (sṛṣṭi), maintenance (sthiti), withdrawal (saṃhṛti), covering (tirodhana) and grace
(anugraha) are main activities of Paramādvaitic absolute.
94 Unlike in Advaita vedānta, where this play would be interpreted as illusion māya. See Baumer
1995, 37-38.
95 TA 101, heyopādeyakathāvirahe svānandaghanatayocchalanam | krīḍā sarvotkarṣeṇa vartanecchā
tathā svatantratvam
96 SKV 29:... iti vā yasya saṃvittiḥ krīḍātvenākhilaṃ jagat | sa paśyansatataṃ yukto jīvanmukto na
saṃśayaḥ... See SK. II.5. Singh 1980, 119. See also Dyczkowski 1992, line 165.
97 Enn. III.2.17.28. Transl. by Armstrong, See also Proclus, De decem dub. 60 (TLG ed.).
98 ŚS. III.9-11:nartaka ātmā / raṅgo'ntarātmā / prekṣakāṇīndriyāṇi Dyczkowski, MBDL 2005, line
73-75.
99 Based on Bharatamuni’s Nāṭyaśāstra. See 6.15. “The following eight rasas should be remembered
in
drama:
loving,
ridiculous,
sad,
angry,
heroic,
terrible,
disgusting
and
wonderful.”śṛṅgārahāsyakaruṇā raudravīrabhayānakāḥ / bībhatsādbhutasaṃjñau cetyaṣṭau nāṭye
rasāḥ smṛtāḥ (Abhinavagupta adds to this list a ninth, peaceful rasa, as either another member of the
raw, or as a basis of the remaining eight rasas. See Masson 1969,91-151).
100 Gnoli 1956, L-LI, n.1.

Comparative Philosophy 4.2 (2013)

JUST

20

The tasting of rasa takes an active part within the spectator’s Soul. In fact, it is a
tasting of the delight of one’s own consciousness (svasaṃvidcarvaṇā).101 This delight
is revealed to the concentrated “unobstacled” consciousness (nirvighna cit). 102
Abhinavagupta describes this state in similar terms both in his aesthetical and
philosophical works: as the repose in one’s own self (svātmaviśrānti) which is caused
either by the flow of the emotional juice (rasa) or by yogic meditation. 103
Occasionally, he compares both states: the non-difference of consciousness
(saṃvidabheditatva) reached by aesthetic delight (rasāsvāda) and the fullness of
consciousness (saṃvidpūrṇatva) reached step by step in yoga (brahmāsvāda).104 As
the ultimate sense of drama is tasting the essence, rasa, i.e. one of the 8 primary
emotions, so too the ultimate sense of theatrum mundi is tasting the essence or “juice”
of it, i.e., consciousness.105
The Supreme Lord’s unique state of emotivity is the outpouring of pure Being. It is
manifest as the brilliance (sphurattā) of the universe which, if we ponder deeply, is the single
flavour (ekarasa) of the essence of Beauty which is the vibration of the bliss of one’s own
nature.106

The last related metaphor to which I would draw attention is that of the dance of
the Soul. On both sides of our comparison, it serves an expression of the dynamic
nature of consciousness. Thus according to Plotinus, Time (chronos) belongs to the
sphere of Soul, and is considered to be the moving image of eternity. The meaning is
explained and ethymologized by Proclus as a circular dance (choros) around the
Intellect (choros-nous).107 We find the same metaphor expressing the same thought in
Paramādvaita, where Time (kāla)108 and its constantly changing nature is described
101 See Masson 1969. 42-43.
102 “Once one has overcome distraction, the pleasure one enjoys through the sentiments of love etc.,
expressed in poetry or drama for example, differs from the pleasure derived from sense object. This is
because (one gains access to it) by removal of such obstacles as anticipation of possible personal gain.
So, once freed of these impediments, the experience (pratīti) is one of relishing (rasanā), tasting
(carvaṇa) or contentment (nirvṛti) and is, in fact, repose in cognising subjectivity.” (Abhinavagupta,
īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, Transl. in Dyczkowski 1989, 148.)
103 Masson 1969. 42-43, 153-164.
104 ...kṣaṇake tattaddraṣṭṭasaṃvidabheditām || kramoditāṃ sadya eva labhate tatpraveśanāt
yogābhyāsakramopāttāṃ tathā pūrṇāṃ svasaṃvidam || Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 16065-68.
But in fact “ ..the bliss that comes from finding rest in God is far superior (prakṛṣyate), ...aesthetic
pleasure (rasāsvāda) is only reflection (avabhāsa) of drop (vipruṣ) of that mystic bliss.”
(Abhinavagupta, Dhvynyālokālocana, transl in Masson, 1969, 158)
105 ...The so called supreme bliss, the lysis, the wonder, is therefore nothing but a tasting, that is, a
cogitation in all its compact density, of our own liberty... Gnoli 1956, XLIV. See also Dyczkowski
1989, 147-8.
106 Mahārthamañjarī, transl. In Dyczkowski 1989, 51.
107 In Tim. III.9.16-18; 28.00. Plotinus used the metaphor of circular dance for the movement of stars
(considered as ensouled bodies). However, this movement is an expression of perfect harmony and
eternal life of All-Soul. (Enn. IV.4.8.). In general, the One is depicted as a point, the Intellect as a
circle, and the Soul as a moving circle. (Enn. IV.4.15.)
108 According to the nomenclature of the system, kāla is one of 6 “coverings” which cover the
fettered consciousness of an embodied Soul. (IPK+IPKV, III.2.4-19.) But here we focus on the
dynamic nature of consciousness in general.
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as the wheel of energies, (śakticakra) 109 and understood as a sequence of 12 kālīs.110
This everlasting movement of power, which expresses itself in the changing forms of
the wheel of energies that turns with each single act of cognition, is often
metaphorically depicted as dancing (nṛtyantī) goddess, Śakti, the power of the
absolute, as she moves round Śiva, the eternal witness, the absolute itself.111
The key term, which bridges the aesthetics and philosophy of Paramādvaita, is
camatkāra (verbatim: savouring, meaning: astonishment, wonder). It is a mood into
which God is driven by his own Śakti.112 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta use it as a
near synonym for reflective awareness (vimarśa).113 There is a good reason for this:
the reflective awareness is a savouring of the pure, expanding consciousness. This is
accompanied by wonder and astonishment.114 It is cit-śakti in her highest form and as
such she is often hailed.115
The enchanting power of beauty naturally concentrates the mind and brings the
attentive yogi towards its vibrant source, which actually lays within himself. This is
why we are often advised in Tantras116 to follow an aesthetic experience of whatever
kind (food, art, music, and poetry, as well as love affairs and other erotic situations).
E.g., in Vijñānabhairavatantra where, after several suggestions to concentrate on
different sources of sensual beauty, we find the teaching summarized: “Wherever the
mind finds joy manifested, that should be contemplated (by a yogi) since that is the
true nature of ultimate joy (which is Śiva, the dynamic absolute itself).”117
109 SK I.1, SKV 3.
110 E.g. by Kṣemarāja in SpN: Singh 1980 7,13.
111 E.g.: SKV 164.: He (Śambhu, Śiva), like a newly wedded husband, constantly gazes at His beloved
power Who, although inwardly undivided, dances in many ways outside (Her) own nature, (Her)
diverse forms and seemingly new aspects conceived in the varied light of thought. (Transl. By
Dyczkowski 1981, 126)
112 Abhinavagupta in Abhinavabhāratī gives a classical example of camatkāra: ...“Viṣṇu is still
today in a state of camatkāra: how, oh how is that limbs of Lakṣmī, which are like the borders of a
limb of the moon, have not been convulsed by mount Mandara?” That is to say, what is called
camatkāra is an uninterrupted state of immersion (āveśa) in an Enjoyment... (Translated in Seturaman,
1992, 47).
113 IPKV 1.5.11, For a detailed summary of the semantic field of camatkāra, see also n. 23 in Torella
2002, 118-119.
114 “...The words wonder (camatkāra), immersion (nirveśa), tasting (rasanā), sampling (āsvādana),
enjoyment (bhoga), accomplishment (samāpatti), lysis (laya), rest (viśrānti) etc., mean simply a form
of consciousness completely free from any obstacles.” Abhinavabhāratī, translated in Seturaman,
1992, 49.
115 Abhinavagupta e.g. in PTV comments on Utpaladeva, IPK I.6.7 cited above (n. 31):
svātmacamatkārarūpā śāktollāsamayaviśvāmarśanarūpa (..it is the wonder of once own self, the
playful power of all forms of reflective awareness..) Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 572-573. In the
same text he hails the consort of Śiva ...svātantryaikarasāveśacamatkāraikalakṣaṇā parā bhagavatī
… (the supreme goddess characterized by only sign of wonder which originates only from immersion
into the essence of freedom) Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 4610.
116 Non-dualistic tantras are an older, revealed, anonymous layer of the younger “scholastic” one, as
represented by Abhinavagupta and other commentators.
117 V.Bh. 74: yatra yatra manastuṣṭirmanastatraiva dhārayet | tatra tatra parānandasvarūpaṃ
saṃpravartate ||
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Keeping all this in mind, we can conclude that for both Neoplatonism and
Paramādvaita aesthetic beauty and the emotional response it generates (ekplexis,
camatkāra) are means which help the Soul, first to concentrate its mind-stream and
forget worldly affairs, then to follow the impulse within and reflect directly upon
herself. This movement might even lead to union (henosis, samāveṣa) with the source
of all beauty, consciousness itself. In both systems this source lays beyond the form
through which it is communicated. Both systems advise the use of the enchanting
power of beauty in a contemplative mental experiment as a means by which to shift
consciousness from a discursive modus of mind towards non-discursive intuition: in
terms of Neoplatonism, this means the ascent from sense perception (aisthesis) and
discursive thinking (dianoia) towards intuitive seeing (noesis); in Paramādvaita the
same movement is from direct experience (pratyakṣa) and the mental construct it
generates (vikalpa), towards intuition (pratibhā) and reflective awareness (vimarṣa).
The similar doctrinal base is moreover occasionally expressed by the similar
metaphors, like that of theatrum mundi, or the dance of the Soul.
Thus one of the most striking features of both systems is their ability to
incorporate sensual beauty and the emotional response generated by it, within their
metaphysical and soteriological frames. Both Neoplatonism and the Paramādvaita do
so in an analogical socio-historical context, as both faced an orthodox ascetic
intellectual environment which avoided any contact with the world of sense and its
beauty, considering it a dangerous trap of illusion. There is perhaps no coincidence
that both Plotinus and Abhinavagupta were great philosophers and aestheticians at
once. In both cases their doctrines were addressed to educated laymen, not monks of
some particular religious sect. The philosophers did not wished to cut the social
branch that they were sitting on. And so the world in its physical form was not
intellectualized away but saved by contemplative focus on its beauty.
4. FURTHER PERSPECTIVES OF RESEARCH ON
NEOPLATONISM AND PARAMĀDVAITA
If a high degree of correspondence of Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita has been
successfully demonstrated, a wide field opens up that has not yet been a subject of
study, as far as I know, neither in this nor in any other text. First, how far might this
correspondence progress and what are its limits? I am, of course, conscious of the
basic nature of the Platonic tradition, which is “objectivist”, as well as the nature of
Paramādvaita, which is “subjectivist”. But some passages in Enneads can be
interpreted as steps towards non-dual, subject-based thinking as we know it from
India, where some Advaita traditions correspond more or less accurately with their
doctrines. We might conclude that some of the ideas of Enneads can be found in the
scriptural corpus of Paramādvaita, where we can find them perhaps in a developed
and radicalised form. We can also find corresponding elements within the notion of
the dynamic absolute, the radical subjectivism wherein the “outer world” depends on
the Soul whose freedom is both its natural state and the ultimate goal of human life,
the doctrine of multilevelled subjectivity connected with the doctrine of multileveled
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speech, the doctrine of mutual interdependence or even interpenetration of everything
with everything else. This list merely summarizes some of the most important topics,
most of which have been discussed above; and all this needs further discussion by
specialists in each subject. But if our thesis stands up such discussion, what further
questions might be asked?
How is it possible that this philosophical doctrine seems to have travelled across
geographical and cultural boundaries with such unbelievable ease? This might be
explained either by the nature of the subject itself, namely the nature of the mind as it
appears under a focused and systematic introspection, which is the method par
excellence of both compared systems, or by a cross-cultural exchange of ideas based
on real contact on oral or textual level. Let us return once more to F. Staal and apply
one of his conclusions here: since direct textual parallels, e.g. translations, seem
difficult to be found, the question of real contact may remain forever open as its
answer more or less depends on the personal preferences of each interpreter.118 We
could take the first path and presume that doctrinal parallels are derived from the
nature of the mind itself; we are thus led to the old doctrine of eternal philosophy
(philosophia perennis or theologia prisca), originated in Corpus hermeticum and
formulated e.g. by the Renaissance Platonist Marsilio Ficino: an ethernal universal
wisdom which has been imparted to all nations by their prophets. 119 Taking the path
of “influence” would on the other hand lead to an increasingly detailed study of
history with a proportionally increasing degree of speculative theorising based on the
growing amount of material of such study.
I began my text by promising for methodological reasons to abstain from
hypothesizing about the influence between these systems; however, we cannot
altogether exclude the possibility that this occurred. Historical and archaeological
research in the Kashmiri region might reopen the question from an alternative
perspective. Can we expect the rise of a “Hellenistic hypothesis” from the ruins of the
“Orientalist”? Keeping in mind the unique Greco-Indian cultural mixture of northern
Bactria, we have a double reason for not excluding such option.
I would be especially interested in exploring a further question. If we insist on
abstaining from questions of influence, can we explain the similarity by use of
structural reason? Both systems are a late stadium of a long existing tradition of
monistic idealism, each of its kind. Could their similarity be caused by their similar
polemical interaction with a similar opponent? What about the influence of criticism
from a sceptical position on such an idealism? From what we know of the history of
both systems, they were under fire by sceptics and their anti-substantionalistic or
generally anti-metaphysical and anti-dogmatic dialectic. (“Nothing is in itself more
this than that”).120 With one, it was the polemic with Mahāyāna Buddhism.121 With

118 Staal 1961, 23.
119 We could find the same concept under the name ‘sanātana dharma’ in India.
120 In its highly formalized form the skepsis condensed in both tradition to the “fourfold formula”:
Nāgārjuna: One should say of each thing that it neither is, nor is not, nor both is and is not, nor
neither is nor is not.
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the other, it was the polemic with late-antic scepticism. 122 Recent scholarship
suggests that the middle way school (Mādhyamika) of Nāgārjuna, with its sudden
blossoming of Buddhist skepsis based on developed dialectic.
...(Which) originated in the Greco-Buddhist communities of India through a conflation
of the Greek Democritean-sophistic-sceptical tradition with rudimentary and
unformalized empirical and sceptical elements already present in early Buddhism.123

We might hypothesize that the reaction of monistic idealism to devastating
sceptical arguments that target its notion of substance and therefore all its doctrines,
be it permanent, immortal Soul, or omnipotent, creative absolute, 124 might be to
develop an emphasis on the dynamic nature of the first principle, based on radical
holism and personal contemplative experience. Greek philosophers used the weapon
of dialectic with two contradictory motives. The metaphysical branch, represented by
the Plato, Parmenides and partly by the Academy, used dialectic to destroy belief in
the reality of conditioned being so that a mystical intuition of unconditioned being
might be ensured, whereas the critical branch, represented by Democritus, Pyrhon
and Sextus, used dialectic to free the mind from the belief that mind-concepts
correspond to reality, so as to develop a suspension of belief (epoche), followed by an
emotional balance of the mind (ataraxia).125
In India, the critical branch would roughly correspond to early Mahāyāna
Buddhism, whereas the metaphysical branch would correspond to Advaita stream of
Indian philosophical thinking, including to some extent, with its uncompromised
emphasis on transcendence-in-immanence and blending of realism and idealism.
Paramādvaita can be rather seen as a synthesis of both views, although with obvious
prevalence of metaphysical over the critical.
The “structural hypothesis” is further supported by the fact that the Mahāyāna
school has undergone the same development, i.e. a shift to a metaphysical position of
essentialism. Thus Mahāyāna in its later stages, in order to emphasize the activity of
Buddha-nature that expresses itself in acts of wisdom and compassion, tried to
overcome early Mādhyamika scepticism by the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
According to this doctrine of the germ of Buddhahood (Tathāgatagarbha), the
highest Buddha-nature (dharmakāya) as the eternal innermost core of reality is
Sextus Empiricus: We should say of each thing that it no more is than is not, than both is and is
not, than neither is nor is not.
121 See Kawajiri 2006, Ratie 2010.
122 Mostly Sextus Empiricus, See Kuhn 2008. The similarities of Buddhist and Greek scepticism is
discussed (e.g.) in Evilley 2002, 450-490.
123 Evilley 2002, 503. “It is very suggestive that the areas of India where Mahāyāna Buddhism is most
commonly supposed to have arisen - Gāndhāra, Kaśmīr and Amarāvatī – are the areas where the
Greek culture penetrated most deeply.” Evilley 2002, 502.
124 The (sceptical) doctrine of indeterminacy (Grk. aorista, “lack of boundary or definition” Skt.
svabhāva śūnyatā) is simultaneously a critique of ontological claims of absolute Being or non-Being,
of epistemological claims for knowledge...and of the view there is a language-reality isomorphism.
125 Evilley 2002, 420.
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immune to the sceptic dialectic of Mādhyamika, for which everything is relative,
mind-only (vijnāptimātra), and thereby without its true nature (asvabhāva), lacking
the self (anātma) and impermanent (anitya).126
Consideration of the structural question is beyond the reach of this text, but let me
hope that it might serve as a ladder for those who next approach such an unexplored
landscape: “When intellectual curiosity climbs higher and higher and sees the truth
without getting tired, this is because of the ladders of thought built by earlier
writers.”127
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